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THE HINDU THEORIES OF ILLUSION
BY RASVIHARY DAS
AMONG the many contributions of the Hindus to Logic and
Epistemology, their discussions on the problem of iUusion have
got an importance of their own. They are hkely to be of particular
interest at the present time when epistemological problems connected
with sense perception are receiving great attention from man\- con-
temporary thinkers. We propose therefore to give in this paper a
critical survey of the principal theories of illusion that are met with
in the standard philosophical writings of the Hindus. We shall also
incidentall}' point out at the end the inexplicable character of the
phenomenon of illusion.
Before any theory is propounded about illusion, the fact of illu-
sion must be taken for granted. But what is an illusion? An
illusion is a case of perception in which the object perceived is not
found to be there. The illusory character of a perception is not
realised at the time of perception. It is only when one act of per-
ception is sublated by another perception, directed towards the same
object, that we realise the first perception to have been wrong, and
designate it as an illusion. So long as it was there, it was taken in
all seriousness to be a case of valid perception. The claim to
validity is an essential aspect of illusion. So long as we are not
deceived b}' an appearance, we have really no illusion. Anyway the
important thing about an illusion is that the object as perceived
should not be there. Some other object may indeed be in its place.
But that is not what we take it to be. Mei'ely in perceiving there is
no illusion. It is only by an objective reference that a perception is
determined as an illusion. As a psychological fact an act of per-
ception, whether right or wrong, is as real as any other fact of the
same order. A perception is known as an illusion when the per-
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ceived content fails to justify its mistaken identity with the object
before the perceiver.
Now in iUusion there is certainly some object before the perci-
pient subject, and it must be in some form of contact with the ap-
propriate sense organ of the perceiver. So the object, which is
there, may be said, in a sense, to be perceived. What can be or is
ever perceived is always the object before the perceiver. But the
mental content in the case of illusion is not of the same form and
nature as the object. They are really distinct, and illusion consists
in not taking note of this distinction. This is the non-apprehension
theory (akhyativada) of illusion advocated by the Mimamsakas.
In order to understand the full significance of this theor\-, we
must refer here to the !Mimamsaka doctrine of the self-validity
( svatahpramanyavada ) of all knowledge. According to the
]\Iimamsakas, the validity of an act of knowledge is not derived
from anything outside the knowledge but is inherent in it. \Mien-
ever there is any knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is given
along" with the knowledge. If knowledge as such were not valid, it
would be very difficult to determine its validity by any other means.
It may be supposed that the validity of an act of knowledge can be
determined b\' another act of knowledge. But an act of knowledge
can reall}' determine the validity of another only when the de-
termining knowledge is itself valid, and how shall we be assured of
the validity of this knowledge? If for its validity we are to be re-
ferred to a third act of knowledge, we do not know' how the re-
sulting regressus ad infinitum can ever be stopped.
One may suppose that the validity of a knowledge is due to the
absence of defect in the instrument of knowledge or to the posses-
sion by the object of the exact form that is ascribed to it by knowl-
edge ; because we find that our knowledge is not valid when there
is some defect in the instrument of knowledge and the object does
not possess the form that is ascribed to it by knowledge. But it is
easy to see that the true form of the object and the absence of
defect in the instrument of knowledge must be known in order that
they may be used as criteria of valid knowledge. It is only when
we know that there is no defect in the instrument of knowledge
that w^e can pronounce a particular knowledge to be valid. But how-
are we to know that our knowledge of the absence of defect in the
instrument of knowledge is itself valid? Unless this is valid, it
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cannot validate another knowledge. So we have to suppose either
that our knowledge of the absence of defect in the instrument of
knowledge is valid by itself or that we have to go beyond this knowl-
edge in order to secure its validity. If we accept the latter alternative,
it is again easy to see that we shall be led on to a regressus ad in-
finitum. So we have to accept the former alternative and admit that
knowledge does not owe its validity to an}thing else. If we do not
accept this position, the Alimamsakas say, all our knowledge will be
infected with doubt, and universal scepticism will be the inevitable
consequence.
But if all knowledge as such is valid, what then is an illusion?
It is evident that if we are to explain illusion in the light of this
theory, we must give it a character different from what is generally
associated with it. We should recognise that if illusion were a case
of knowledge, it could not but be valid. So if it is not a case of
valid knowledge, it is no knowledge at all. An illusion, then, is a
case of no-knowledge (akhyati). But this negation of knowledge,
which characterises illusion, should not be taken absolutely. It is
not a fact that we get illusion where there is absolutely no knowl-
edge. If it were so, our dreamless sleep would have been the best
instance of illusion. But this is not so. In illusion something is
surely known, and in so far as there is knowledge, it is all valid.
But there is also some fact which is not taken note of and this non-
cognisance constitutes the real essence of illusion. When a piece
of white shell is mistaken for a piece of silver, what happens is
that although the object before the perceiver, merely as presented
something, is perceived to be there, its specific character is not grasped
on account of some defect in the conditions of perception, either
insufficiency of light or some defect in the eye or something else.
The shining appearance of the piece of shell, which is very similar
to the appearance of silver, revives in our mind certain impressions
which are associated with silver, and in consequence we come to
have a remembrance of silver. The content silver can scarcely be
called a perceived content, since there is no silver in the field of
perception. So silver is not the object of perception but a mental
content revived in the mind by means of memory. The real object
of perception is the piece of white shell present before the percipient
subject. But in illusion we fail to take note of the distinction be-
tween what is presented and what is only revived in the mind by
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memory. The non-apprehension of this distinction defines the char-
acter of illusion.
But how does the shining appearance of a piece of shell produce
in us the memory of silver rather than that of other pieces of shell
which we have seen before, seeing that the appearance of a piece of
shell is similar not only to that of silver but also to the appearance of
other pieces of shell as well ? In order to understand why we re-
member silver and not any piece of shell, which we may have seen
before, we must realise that our interest plays a great part in all
facts of our conscious life. We are more interested in silver, be-
cause of its superior value for us, than in pieces of shell and this
interest accounts for our ready remembrance of silver.
Still there is some difficulty in this position. In all acts of
memory there is a reference to past experience which is signified
by our speaking of the remembered object as "that" and not as
"this." In illusion, however, we say "this is silver" ; and we do not
speak or think of the silver as that silver, which should have been
the case if the silver in question were an object of memor}-.
This difficulty can be solved by supposing that the reference to
past or "thatness" in the remembered silver is overlooked bv us
because of some mental defect, i.e. our greed for wealth. [Moreover
thatness is not an essential aspect of an object of memory. W'hen
for instance we remember the meaning of a word, we do not rec-
ognise it as "that" meaning.
But when in illusion we say "this is silver," we use "this" as the
subject and "silver" as the predicate of one and the same propo-
sition. We imply thereby that "thisness" and "silverhood" occupy
the same locus (samanadhikarana ). And thinking in all serious-
ness "this" to be silver, we go forward to pick it up. This seems to
go against the implications of this theory which supposes that the
silver is only remembered. The silver that is remembered occupies
a different place in time and space and in order to obtain it we
should not move towards a place where it is not.
To meet this objection we have to remember that in illusion we
have two distinct acts of knowledge and that they differ in their
character as well as in their object. The one is perception and the
other is memory. The object of the one is "this" and that of the
other "silver." But as the difference between these two distinct
acts of knowledge does not appear to us for the time being, we treat
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them both as identical (in illusion) and refer their objects to the
same locus.
When we have an illusion of silver, silver is no doubt known in
some form. The important question to decide is about the char-
acter of this knowledge. When we can find out what the real object
of this knowledge is, we can find out what its real character is.
The ]\Iimamsakas believe, with their notion of the self-validity of
knowledge, that the object of any act of knowledge can only be
that which appears in it. If the object of knowledge could be
different from what appears in it, we would not have faith in any
knowledge, and would thus involve ourselves in utter scepticism.
So the real object of a knowledge of silver, even in illusion, can
only be real silver. But if this is so^ then what is the nature of
that knowledge ? It may be either perception or inference or
memory. There is no fourth alternative. As there is no silver
before the perceiver, we cannot suppose that there is any preception
of silver. A perception of a thing is possible only when the thing
in question is in direct contact (sannikarsha) with our sense organs.
The object being not present in the case of illusion, we cannot sup-
pose that it is really perceived. It may be supposed that our knowl-
edge of silver in illusion is really perception, the real object of
the perception being the piece of shell which is present before the
perceiver and which somehow appears as silver, owing to some de-
fects in the conditions of perception. But this supposition implies
that the object of a perception can be different from what appears
in it and is therefore open to the objection that it will lead to uni-
versal scepticism as pointed out above. It would be strange if the
content of a perception were to be referred to an object which is
utterly different from it. We conclude therefore that our knowl-
edge of silver in illusion is not perception.
It is also not inference. An inference is always mediated by
the knowledge of a middle term (linga) and in illusion we do not
find any knowledge of a middle term.
Therefore we seem forced to the conclusion that our knowledge
of silver in illusion is of the nature of remembrance. The object of
this knowledge, which is real silver and is not present before us, is
brought to our consciousness by an act of memory.
The Mimamsakas maintain that it is on this theory that we can
satisfactorily explain the subsequent knowledge (on the cessation
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of illusion ) that it is not silver. On any other theory we have to
suppose that our knowledge, that the thing before us is not silver,
is a contradiction of the previous knowledge that it was silver. But
all knowledge being equally valid, there cannot be any real contra-
diction between one knowledge and another. On the Alimamsaka
theory there is no contradiction between the two acts of knowledge.
In the former knowledge we failed to take note of the difference
between the perceived "this" and the remembered "silver," whereas
in the latter we only come to recognise this difference.
The above will give us some idea of the Mimamsaka theory of
illusion as non-apprehension of distinction. JJut a little reflection
will show that it is open to several criticisms. It is maintained by
this theory that both the presented object (this) and the remem-
bered content (silver) are known and onl}- their difference is not
known. But we fail to understand how two things can appear in
knowledge without making at the same time their distinction from
one another apprehended. When two things are cognised, we
naturally expect that the difference between them will also be
cognised.
It has been said that if our knowledge fails to reach its object,
if, that is, the real object is not given in our knowledge, we shall
lose all faith in knowledge. This difficulty can hardly be met even
by this theory. For when we get a knowledge of the form "this is
a table," we cannot be sure whether the table in this act of knowl-
edge is only a remembered table or a perceived one, whether, that
is, the table is or is not present before us.
^Moreover when we judge "this is silver," what is given in our
knowledge is not "this" and "silver" but "this-silver," a complex
unit}- which is analysed in our judgment as "this" and "silver." It
is grasped by a single act of mind and it does not seem to be a cor-
rect reading of facts to suppose that in this one act of knowledge
we have a mixture of both perception and memory.
]\Iere non-apprehension of distinction cannot explain our specific
conduct in any case of illusion. Xon-apprehension is absence of
knowledge. It is absurd to suppose that we can be moved to any
activity (e.g. running away from an illusor}- snake) from mere
lack of knowledge. It is rather in the false identification of one
thing with another that we must look for the essence of illusion.
So the Naivavikas hold that when in illusion we sav "this is
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silver" there is an attribution of silverhood to the presented object.
There is no doubt about the fact that in an illusion of silver there
is an appearance of silver. The only question is whether there is
real silver or something else or nothing at all behind the appear-
ance. We cannot suppose that there is nothing at all behind the
appearance, because a mere nothing can never put up an appear-
ance. We cannot also suppose that there is real silver before us
which appears as silver in illusion, because in that case the appear-
ance would not disappear with the cessation of illusion. We have
therefore to suppose that there is something else, namely a piece of
white shell, which appears as silver, because our subsequent percep-
tion is that it is not silver but a piece of white shell. We must
therefore believe, so the Naiyayikas say, that in illusion a thing ap-
pears different from what it actually is. This theory is known as
anyathakhyativada, the theory of different appearance. The
Naivayikas do not believe in the validity of all knowledge. In their
opinion a knowledge is valid only when the object of knowledge pos-
sesses the form that is ascribed to it. In illusion the object of
knowledge (a piece of white shell) has not the form (silverhood)
that is ascribed to it. Therefore it is not valid. If knowledge as
such were always valid, there w^ould be no room, they say, of any
doubt. Since we have real doubts about the validity of some cogni-
tions, w^e cannot think that knowledge as such is always valid. The
Naiyavikas will admit with the Mimamsakas that whenever there
is illusion, there is some defect in the conditions of perception and
we fail to perceive the thing before us clearly. But the illusory
character of a knowledge consists not in our failure to perceive
clearly, but in the actual appearance (khyati) of one thing as an-
other or different (anyatha) from what it actually is.
Although it is generally true that a thing appears as it is, we
are forced, by the subsequent cancellation of our illusory knowledge
to admit that in illusion a thing can and does appear different from
what it actually is. This theory maintains that there is some real
basis of an illusory appearance, and that an illusory object also has
real existence, although not at the place where it is seen in illusion.
Unless there were real silver, which we had seen before, it would not
be possible for us to have an illusion of silver.
There are thus three points to be specially noted in this theory
of illusion: first, the appearance of something other than the object
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before the perceiver; secondly, the existence of a real basis of the
appearance, and thirdl\-, the existence of the illusory object. Let us
consider these points one by one.
According to this theor}-, an illusion is the appearance of an
other. 15ut wherein lies the otherness ? Does the thing behind the
appearance become itself an other and put up the appearance ? or
is there otherness only in the appearance? A thing cannot of
course have the attribute of otherness to itself. It can become an
other onl\- in the sense of being transformed into a different thing
by an actual process of change. If it does so and then presents
itself, we shall no longer call the appearance an illusion, and it will
not be cancelled b}' an}' subsequent knowledge. We have therefore
to suppose that the otherness in question lies merely in the appear-
ance. r>ut w^hat constitutes the otherness of the appearance? The
otherness of the appearance can be constituted only by the fact that
the form of the appearance is that of silver whereas its basis is
something different, that is, a piece of white shell. By the term
"appearance of silver" in this connexion we mean the knowledge of
silver that we get in an illusion of silver; and when we speak of
its otherness we can only mean that our knowledge of silver has
for its basis something which is diiferent from silver. But we can
refer to a thing as the basis of some knowledge only when the form
of the thing appears in that knowledge. When a piece of shell does
not appear in a knowledge, in what sense can it be the basis of that
knowledge ? This leads us to the second point.
Our knowledge of silver in illusion has a real basis or an
unreal one. If it had a real basis, it should not be contradicted at
all. But the fact that it is contradicted shows that it has no real
basis. So it can have only an unreal basis. But an unreal basis is
no basis at all. To say that our knowledge of silver in illusion has
no basis at all is to say that there can be an appearance which need
not have any basis.
It may be said that there is real silver in the world, and hence
our knowledge of silver, even in illusion, is not absolutel}- baseless.
But although silver as silver may exist somewhere else, e.g. in the
shop of a silver-smith, silver as appearing in illusion, i.e. in the
form of a presented object at a particular point of space, has no
real existence. When in illusion our knowledge is of the form "this
is silver," the basis of this knowledge can be either "this as identi-
228 THE OPEN COURT
fied as one with silver" or merely "this" or merely "silver." "This"
(the object before the perceiver) as silver does not exist, for the
object before the perceiver is only a piece of shell and not silver. So
only "this" or only "silver" can be the basis. But in either case our
knowledge would not be of the form "this is silver," but would be
either of the form "this" or of the form "silver." It is difficult to
maintain therefore that there is any real basis for an illusory ap-
pearance.
Let us now consider whether an illusion anyway implies the
existence of the illusory object. When our illusion of silver is cor-
rected, we certainly say "this is not silver" and thus deny the exist-
ence of the silver that appeared in illusion. Real silver might have
been experienced before, from which we got the idea of silver, but
whether it exists somewhere else even now, we cannot say either
from the occurrence of illusion or from its correction. It is con-
tended that in the correcting cognition silver itself is not denied,
(we do not say "there is no silver"), but only its identity with the
object before the perceiver. Bvit if merely the negation of the
identity of two things were the meaning of the correcting cogni-
tion, both the things would be given in it. That, however, is not
the case.
These difficulties have persuaded the idealist Buddhists to hold
that it is needless to assume the existence of external things. In
illusion, as everybody admits, we have direct knowledge of a thing
which is not there before us. The silver, seen in illusion, can there-
fore be only a form of knowledge. This theory is known as
atmakhyativada,—the theory of the self-presentation of a knowledge
or an idea. What is in reality a mere idea comes to present itself
as an external object and therein lies the illusory character of an
appearance. What is really there is only a flow of knowledge which
sometimes comes to us in the form of silver and sometimes in that
of a piece of shell.
This view does not seem to be quite plausible. If the silver in
the illusory cognition were a mere idea, it would not come to us as
a presented object. ^loreover this view does not supply us with
any criterion of truth and error. If the flow of knowledge alone
were responsible for everything we see or hear, then there would be
no ground for making any distinction between valid and invalid
knowledge.
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Some Buddhists formulate their theory of illusion in a different
way. What is self-presentation (atmakhyati ), from the point of view
of knowledge, is, from the objective point of view, the presentation
of the unreal (asatkhyati). When on the correction of illusion we
say "this is not silver," we mean that the object before us was never
silver. So in illusion we have the appearance of a thing which is
not there. This theory is therefore called asat-khyativada or the
theory of the presentation of the unreal. If it is objected that what
is unreal cannot have an appearance, the Buddhists will readily
reply that the appearance and the non-appearance of things are not
dependent upon the nature of objects but they are regulated by
avidya or elemental ignorance.
But the problem is not solved how an unreal entity can ever
become the object of our perception. The silver that we see in illu-
sion cannot be absolutely unreal. Because if it were absolutely un-
real, we would not have seen it at all. Xor can it be real, for in
that case it would not be negated in the correcting cognition. So
the silver of illusion belongs to a category of being which is neither
real nor unreal. This is anirvachaniya-khyativada of the \ edantins
(of the Sankara school), the theory of the presentation of the in-
describable.
This theory seems to be necessitated by the insufficiency of asat-
khyativada which supposes the illusory object to be absolutely un-
real. But it is doubtful whether this theory itself makes the matter
any the clearer by its peculiar notion of the indescribable. What
is indescribable in the sense of being neither real nor unreal is really
unthinkable. Real and unreal are generally taken to be mutually
exclusive ; we cannot think of a middle region which is neither real
nor unreal. We do not understand how the indescribable appears
and disappears and are not provided with any means of finding out
whether the object of any of our perceptions is or is not of the
nature of the indescribable, so long as it does not disappear from
the field of perception, yielding its place to a new object.
According to the Vedantins of this school, the propositions "this
is silver" (in illusion) and "this is not silver" (on the cessation of
illusion) have got predicates of different significance. In the first
proposition silver stands for indescribable silver, and in the second
it stands for ordinary silver such as can be had in the market. Such
being the case, there is no real contradiction between these two
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propositions and so the truth of one proposition cannot be taken as
the ground on which the falsity of the other can be asserted. In
fact if we accept this theory, w^e cannot say that the proposition
"this is silver" based on illusion is really false, because some sort
of silver, even though it may be of the indescribable kind, is granted
to be there at the place of illusion, and what sort of silver is ex-
pected by the perceiver is not specified in the proposition itself.
A\'hile we are passing these theories in a critical review, it is
w^ell to recognise that every one of them has got something relevant
to sav regarding some aspect or other of the phenomenon of illu-
sion. We know that our judgments of perception are not wholly
determined by what actually comes from without. Our past ex-
perience, present interests and other accompanying circumstances
are responsible for much that we seem to see or hear. And it is
true that in illusion w^e are not able to distinguish between what is
given outside and what is simply mental. These points are empha-
sised by the theory of non-apprehension (akhyati). The theory
of different appearance (anyatha-khyati) gives us exactly the ordi-
nary view of illusion that it is the appearance of one thing as an-
other. But ontologically the thing seen in illusion is not certainly
there in reality. So it is an appearance of the unreal (asat-kh}'ati).
Hence it is plausible also to suppose that what we see to be there in
illusion is really an idea of the mind (atma-khyati). But if it is
an idea of the mind, how is it seen as an external object? And if
the illusory object is w^iolly unreal, how is it seen at all? These
difficulties have been brought out by the theory of indescribable
appearance (anirvachaniya-khyati ). But if these constitute a real
difficulty, it is such as can admit of no further explanation. When
it is said that a particular phenomenon is an illusion, we must admit
either that we have understood all that requires to be understood
in the case or that we have something which from the nature of the
case is inexplicable. An illusion may be supposed to be explained
completely when the nature of the illusory object is explained.
There is nothing to be explained in mere seeing. It is a self-
explained psychological event. But it is the nature of the illusory
object that raises the whole crop of difficulties. The illusory object
is either a mere nothing or something. If it is something, it is either
real or unreal. If it is real then it is either psychical or physical.
These alternatives appear to be exhaustive and w^e find that none
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of them is explicable in the case of the illusor_\- object. The illusory
object is not a mere nothing which by itself is not a possible object
of thought or perception. It is surely something, but a something
which cannot be said to be either real or unreal. If it were unreal,
it would be a mere nothing and would not be seen at all. If it were
real, it w^ould be either psychical or physical. ]!ut if it were psy-
chical, it would not have an external appearance, and if it were
physical it would not disappear. So it is neither psychical nor
physical, and we cannot conceive of a third variety. Hence we can-
not say that it is real at all. When we realise that it is nothing in
the world of reality, we can easily understand that there is nothing
in realit}' which can serve as its ground and supply its explanation.
We have to take it simply as a fact of experience that in illusion we
have the appearance of a thing which is not there. When a knowl-
edge is recognised to be an illusion, we must acknowledge that
epistemologically it has received a final characterisation beyond
which nothing further can be said about it to make its nature more
intelligible to us.
